Time for a Reset in European Security and Defence

Edition of the EUCO Debrief on security and defence - 24 July 2024

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In this edition of the European Council Experts’ Debrief, our experts focus on the theme of security and defence. We asked eleven experts to respond to the following question, formulated by TEPSA Secretary-General Jim Cloos and Executive Director Mariam Khotenashvili: “In view of the multiple new threats in a rapidly changing world, the effects of the Russian war on Ukraine, and growing uncertainties about the US commitment to European security, the time has come for a qualitative leap towards the objectives outlined in Article 42 TEU. What should be the key ingredients of such a reset? How could it best be ensured and operationalised, in terms of EU internal structures, resources, and ambition? Should the United Kingdom be associated to the process towards a European common defence, and how? What should the future role of NATO be? Do you consider that the Strategic Agenda adopted by the European Council at its June meeting is an adequate first response to these questions?“

As the European Union increasingly seeks to assert itself in a difficult geopolitical world, the question of how to ensure European security and defence has become more and more prominent. The context of Europe’s hard security having been ensured by NATO since the 1950s, a setup in which the role of the United States is crucial, has clashed with the current reality of new threats emerging in a rapidly changing world and of Russia’s war of aggression in Ukraine. With a potential second Trump Presidency in America, the question of Europe making its own way in security and defence must be addressed.

In addition to the foreword by TEPSA Secretary-General Jim Cloos, expert contributors to this edition include:
- Claude-France Arnould, European Defence Agency, Belgium & French Ministry of Foreign Affairs and French institute of International Relations, France
- Daniel Fiott, Centre for Security, Diplomacy and Strategy, Vrije Universiteit Brussel, Belgium & Real Instituto Elcano, Spain
- Tyyne Karjalainen, Finnish Institute of International Affairs, Finland
- Robert Madelin, FIPRA International, United Kingdom
- Hennadiy Maksak, Ukrainian Prism, Ukraine
- Aleksandra Palkova, Latvian Institute of International Affairs, Latvia
- Nicoletta Pirozzi, Istituto Affari Internazionali, Italy
- Wojciech Przybylski, Visegrad Insight & Res Publica Foundation, Poland
- Kristi Raik, International Centre for Defence and Security, Estonia
- Luigi Scazzieri, Centre for European Reform, Belgium
- Paul Taylor, European Policy Centre, Belgium

Contribution de Claude-France Arnould ci-dessous :

A qualitative leap towards a European defence?

By CLAUDE-FRANCE ARNOULD, Former Chief Executive, European Defence Agency, Former Ambassador, French Ministry of Foreign Affairs Advisor for European Affairs, French Institute of International Relations

Has the time come for a qualitative leap towards the objectives of the EU Treaty on defence and an operational reflection on Article 42(7) of the Treaty on European Union (TEU)? “If a Member State is the victim of armed aggression on its territory, the other Member States shall have ... an obligation of aid and assistance by all means in their power.” Military action is obviously part of these means. Two factors plead for a positive answer: the tangible threats emanating from Russia’s behaviour, but also other risks, if we consider the geography of the EU, including territories beyond Europe, and the uncertainty on the American position concerning European security.

Some would argue that it is too late to develop a genuine EU defence policy, and that history has decided otherwise. According to that view, the only insurance for the defence of Europe lies within NATO. This is in line with Article 42(7) TEU: “Commitments and cooperation in this area shall be consistent with commitments under the NATO, which, for those States which are members of it, remains the foundation of their collective defence and the forum for its implementation.” Now that war is back in Europe, collective defence should indeed be the main driver, and the full strength of the Atlantic alliance constitutes the best insurance for European security.

The fact though is that already during the Obama presidency, the US signalled its intent to “pivot” towards Asia. American disengagement in Europe could occur more brutally if Trump is re-elected. At the very least it risks becoming a crude bargaining chip.

Therefore, many Europeans are primarily concerned with keeping the Americans on board, even considering the ‘price’: aligning with US policies, buying American weapons, compromising on trade and industry interests, forgetting about autonomy, “reciprocity” or “level playing field”, and just “hoping for the best” - namely American military action in the case of an attack against an EU member, which is more than what Article 5 of the NATO treaty obliges to do.

Another answer is bolder: ‘Europeanise’ NATO. One possibility is that France, and the UK, traditionally the two major European military players, would step in, including with their nuclear status. A second one is that the EU should constitute a solid ‘European pillar’ in NATO. In this scenario, the solidarity of the Alliance is maintained, even reinforced, but, if needed, the Europeans could act by themselves. This option is, politically, the most satisfactory, but it demands absolute clarity about the availability of the necessary assets to fight an adversary like Russia.

The question of availability is twofold. Firstly, it is about the availability of NATO common assets, such as command and planning headquarters, secure communications and intelligence. The NATO structure relies on the American backbone, incarnated by the NATO operational Supreme Allied Commander Europe, an American General, double hatted as Commander of the American forces in Europe. Establishing a separate European headquarters is far from easy and requires precise granularity on the feasibility.

Secondly, this means the readiness of adequately equipped forces and strategic ‘enablers’, where Europeans face serious shortfalls. That is why a strong European “defence and technological basis” is key: it conditions freedom of action. The security of supply must be ensured, and Europeans must be free to use and adapt their complex weapon systems according to their own military needs.

The EU can and must develop an efficient armament policy; the Commission has taken significant initiatives, including funding to incentivise cooperation, scale up production and create synergies. Creating an European equivalent of the US foreign military sales system, which facilitates government to government acquisition, would be a major advance. The EDA offers the appropriate structure to enable Defence Ministers to organise their cooperation, with the maximum level of flexibility and speed, whilst respecting the intergovernmental competences. The armament decisions must stem from military requirements and be translated in joint procurement and programs.

EDA also offers an opportunity to reengage in a cooperation with the UK, which would make eminent sense. It is flexible enough and cooperates with structures to which the UK belongs: the European Space Agency and the Organisation for Joint Armament Cooperation, which manages some European armament programs.

The Strategic Agenda recently adopted by the EUCO remains general. More is needed in terms of clear and operational direction from the Heads of State or Government. How to organise the autonomous defence capability of the Europeans? What are the capabilities and processes in NATO the European could use for military action without a NATO consensus? What would Europe need to “duplicate” if not available? Who does what within the EU and how do we ensure the role of Defence Ministers and adequate cooperation between the High Representative, EDA, and the Commission? What should be the terms of an understanding with the US and the UK?

Defence is not a policy like others. Even less so in the present threatening strategic context. But it is in the interest of Europeans to use the EU framework to develop their ability to act, and in so doing to reinforce our transatlantic alliance.

Pour lire les contributions des autres experts, veuillez consulter la pièce jointe.