URGENT NEED FOR REAL COLLECTIVE EUROPEAN MILITARY ACTION CAPACITY
By Jean-Paul Perruche, Lieutenant-general (retired), Former President of EuroDéfense-France
The Russia-Ukraine war has caught those who thought that war in Europe was a thing of the past off-guard; it has revealed not only the extent of disarmament in European countries, but also their inability to act collectively other than under American leadership.
Since the end of the Cold War, European defence budgets have shrunk in staggering proportions, while elsewhere in the world countries have been investing in rearmament. The vast majority of European countries now simply do not have the capacity to engage in high-intensity combat.
Figures for the equipment destroyed since 24 February 2022 in the war being waged by the Russian and Ukrainian armies (published on the Oryx website and based on satellite observations) point to Russian losses of (at least) 1,012 tanks and 340 artillery systems with Ukraine having lost 252 tanks and 125 artillery systems, a large proportion of which were destroyed during the first weeks of the war.
Comparing these figures with the equipment possessed by French army, the EU’s most powerful army, which has just 220 tanks and 88 artillery systems (with very small stocks of ammunition), the limits of the European countries when it comes to high-intensity warfare are patently clear.
The war has also highlighted the essential need for the Europeans to dispose of a collective capacity for military action, so that they can not only intervene without the backing of the United States, if need be, but also be more effective when acting alongside the Americans.
Politicians and academics regularly level criticisms at NATO, at the very justification for its existence and its actions. Yet, what could the Europeans have done in response to the invasion of Ukraine if the United States had not been prepared to come on board? On what basis could they have negotiated with Vladimir Putin, for whom power politics are all he understands? None if the European countries were in a position to dissuade the Russian’s from attacking to any serious extent. Although the EU members had a combined defence budget four times higher that of Russia, they had no credible capacity for collective military action, nor the military potential to discourage Russia or help Ukraine ward off the Russian assault.
However, while this conflict is taking place in Europe and primarily affects the Europeans, its progress and outcome depend essentially on the balance of power between the United States and Russia.
This situation stems from Europe’s dependency on the Americans in NATO, which should have lost its purpose with the disintegration of the USSR, but which most of the European countries chose to cling on to for “convenience”.
The war in Ukraine is not the only indication of Europe’s military weakness.
Further to south in the continent, Turkey’s President Erdogan is increasingly throwing challenges at European countries – especially Greece – despite the fact we are all supposed to be NATO allies. His attitude would certainly be less aggressive if the solidarity demonstrated by the EU countries was based on a credible, common capacity for military action.
In a world where power politics are inexorably replacing the rules of international law inherited from the 20th century, it is vital that Europeans should realise that it is only by effectively uniting their forces that they will be able to avoid having to bow to rivals now far more powerful than they are.
For this, the first thing they must do is break with a system that keeps them powerlessness, a system based on the belief that the guarantee of American security in NATO is only possible because the Europeans are incapable of concerted action.
The days when Madeleine Albright voiced her suspicions about the emergence of the CSDP in the EU are over. The United States’ interest in European security is primarily linked to their desire to defend democratic values and to have access to an attractive European market. In a context marked by increasing rivalry with China and where most of the US’s strategic interests lie in the Indo-Pacific region, the American need European partners capable of catering to their own security more effectively. The nature and scale of their interests and, by extension, the security guarantees they are prepared to offer Europe are volatile, as borne out by the strategic tweaks applied by the Obama and Trump administrations. And while the United States is currently providing massive support to Ukraine, President Biden has already made it clear that American troops will not participate the conflict. American support, but Ukrainian blood, an approach consistent with the attitude of President Obama during the 2011 operations in Libya, namely “leadership from behind”. The Americans may be supportive but it is the Europeans that are in front line of fire.
The idea that the US is hostile to the emergence of a credible European military capacity no longer holds water, as illustrated by a rising number of publications from American think tanks, and especially the Atlantic Council of the United States.
Europeans must now face up to their responsibilities and quickly find ways and means of defending their interests on the military and, especially, operational fronts. Progress since the implementation of CSDP (structures and capabilities) in the early 2000s has been minimal and manifestly does not live up to the aspirations of Europe’s citizens, who want a EU that will protect them. As the concept of a “European army” akin to a national army is utopian at this stage, it is preferable to speak of the emergence of a strong common European defence capability (to use the terms employed in the treaties).
A first step was taken in March 2022 with the adoption by the European Council of the “Strategic Compass”. This identifies common threats and risks in the new strategic environment, advocates consistent action based on common objectives, and makes provision for reinforcement of operational capacities in response to crises, especially through:
- anticipatory planning;
- investment in innovation, research and capability building (rapid response force of 5,000 troops);
- reinforcement of the operational chain of command (C2); and
- a more integrated approach to crisis management.
This is, however, only a first step, and practical measures will be needed to enable the EU to be effective in the most exacting potential crisis scenarios identified under the Strategic Compass. These scenarios should be used to establish the types of action to be undertaken by the EU, the conditions for their execution, the political and military command systems, capability needs and the desirable level of integration and coordination among the national armed forces.
Plans in relation to the different scenarios and based on the principles set out by Marshal Foch (unity of action, concentration of efforts, and economy of resources) should be drawn up in anticipation and endorsed by EU Member States. These plans would clarify the principles and conditions for military engagement, and enable political decisions to be expedited should the need arise. This was NATO’s approach during the Cold War.
These plans should then be trialled through exercises in order to confirm their validity and, above all, improve European common action capabilities as a prelude to the creation of a European operational culture.
These capabilities would also strengthen the credibility and thus the effectiveness of European diplomacy.
The world has changed and Europe again has war on its doorstep, in these days when the West and its values are coming under fire from an alliance of autocrats. Europeans should waste no time in adopting Marshal de Lattre’s motto: “Never give in” (in French, ne pas subir)..
Lt. Gen. (retired) Jean Paul Perruche, September 2022
Article translated into English by students at ISIT Paris, and proofread by Christine Cross (EuroDéfense-France Council member).
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