FRENCH MILITARY PROGRAMMING ACT 2024-2030

EUROPEAN ASPECTS

The Military Programming Act 2024-2030 (MPL) announced by French President, Emmanuel Macron when presenting the conclusions of the National Strategic Review on 9 November 2022 in Toulon is designed essentially to:

- ensure the country’s strategic autonomy, with nuclear deterrence as its security backbone;

- enable it to fulfil its undertakings as a NATO ally and EU member, existentially anchored in European Defence and helping to strengthen NATO;

- establish France by 2030 as a equilibrium power on the international scene.

1) The MPL is consistent with the national and European institutional framework in that it is compliant with the requirements of the intergovernmental Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) as set out in Article 42 of the Treaty on European Union.

Paragraph 2.2.4 of the report in appendix to the MPL states, inter alia, that the budget earmarked for the Defence Task Force, on a like-for-like basis (excluding pension costs), for which provision is made in Article 3 of the Act will be used in particular for collaborative operations contributing to European Strategic Autonomy.

2) The Ministry of Armed Forces is keen to give fresh impetus to defence procurement in application of the traditional, three-category rationale:

The first category of equipment relates to sovereign domains with fundamental implications as regards national security interests. These are areas, of which nuclear deterrence is a good example, where France is keen to maintain national control over technologies and uphold its ability to design, produce, and sustainably maintain the equipment used.

The second category comprises equipment to be acquired from allied and friendly countries or through cooperation with these countries. European procurement is the preferred option for all other than ‘sovereign’ equipment.

This second type of equipment may be available on the European market or obtained through a process of European cooperation. Cooperation of this type is an excellent way for partner countries to share investment costs and foster interoperability. More generally, it is conducive to the development of European defence, both institutionally and industrially, and to strengthening EU Member States’ contribution to NATO military capabilities. It is also instrumental in strengthening the ties between Member States within a mutually accepted interdependent framework founded on recognised centres of excellence.

For this second category, equipment may also be procured through well-balanced transatlantic cooperation, particularly in a NATO context, if the required conditions for technology transfer and reciprocal market access can be established. A notable example of this is the air command and control system, which is to be managed in close association with the NATO Air Command and Control System programme.

Aside, from a few specialised systems, the third category consists of common equipment obtainable from several different suppliers. The Ministry of the Armed Forces turns to the world market for this type of procurement.

3) Cooperation within the EU, particularly the Future Combat Air System (FCAS) and the Main Ground Combat System (MGCS) is decisive.

FCAS is a system that combines the following within a “combat cloud”:

- a first circle consisting of aircraft (including new generation fighters), drones, cruise missiles and remote carriers;

- a second circle comprising other air, naval or land platforms.

Dassault Aviation is the prime contractor for the FCAS system and for a new generation aircraft, simulation labs and stealth technology, in association with the following other French manufacturers:

- Safran (with the German company MTU) for the engine;

- MBDA for the remote carriers;

- THALES for the combat cloud and sensors.

By facilitating industrial restructuring, particularly KMW+NEXTER Defence Systems (KNDS) in the land armaments sector, European cooperation helps to strengthen the European Defence Technological and Industrial Base (EDTIB) and to foster real strategic autonomy.

By encouraging operational partnerships, such as the Franco-Belgian Motorised Capability (Capacité Motorisée [CaMo]) project, cooperation plays a part in setting the foundations for interoperability in a European framework, with the ultimate objective of extending this to NATO, the reference framework for defining the conditions for interoperability.

In this connection, FCAS is a decisive factor in defining the conditions for interoperability between its various components and with other naval, space, airborne and land systems with which it will have to interface. The conditions for interoperability with other future systems, such as the Global Combat Air Programme between Italy, Japan and the UK, will be established within NATO.

4) The other examples of European cooperation remain fundamental, especially those involving the United Kingdom. Here cooperation is organised on the basis of the Lancaster House Treaties, signed in 2010. MBDA, the world’s leading missile manufacturer, is largely a product of this type of cooperation. On 10 March 2023, during the Franco-British summit, both France and the United Kingdom agreed to continue developing the Future Cruise/Anti-Ship Weapon (FC/ASW) to forestall the risk of capability shortages.

5) Exports of defence equipment remain a French sovereign prerogative as clearly stated in the report. The conditions for exporting the equipment produced under cooperation agreements must be specified from the outset. The agreement between France and Germany, expanded to Spain on 17 September 2021, constitutes a reference framework that could become a benchmark if proposed to other EU Member States.

6) According to the report appended to the Act, France benefits from the European developments instigated at the Versailles Summit on 10 and 11 March 2022 and the European Councils. On 24 March 2022, the European Council mandated the European Commission to establish a strategy by approving the “Strategic Compass”. The Commission and the High Representative made their initial proposals in May 2022. In July, they were supplemented by a communication from the Commission about a joint procurement process. Since then, the corresponding Regulation – EDIRPA – has been making its way through the Council and European Parliament decision-making channels.

The European Defence Fund paved the way for reinforcement of the DTIB. The purpose of this instrument, created on the basis of Article 173 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU), is that of reinforcing the European industrial base. It is a community instrument currently being implemented in accordance with the procedures of the research and development framework programmes.

The European Peace Facility is an intergovernmental extra-budgetary financial instrument. This fund, which was initially intended to finance European peacekeeping operations, is now the channel used by EU Member States to support the supply of ammunitions to Ukraine . At the European Council session on 20 March 2023 the following three components of this support were agreed:

- Delivering ammunition to Ukraine from Member States’ stocks and existing orders, with up to €1 billion reimbursed to these Member States by the fund;

- Joint purchases of up to €1 billion via the European Defence Agency or by Member States;

- Steeping up European industrial production capacity by means of exchanges with the European Parliament and the Commission.

The appended report quite rightly mentions the contribution of the French Ministry of Armed Forces to the European Peace Facility, the amounts of which are set by the Council, at EU Foreign Minister level. In this respect, Chancellor Scholz's proposal, during his speech at Charles University in Prague on 29 August 2022, that the Council of EU Defence Ministers should meet on a regular basis is not to be dismissed.

7) The MPL will also benefit from certain key strategic actions launched by the European Commission, the “European Chips Act”, a legislative package for semiconductors being the most representative example. It is important to remember that electronic components account for more than half the cost of any weapons system.

This will give an added boost to priority efforts for the armed forces of the future described in detail in Article 2.2.3 of the appended report (in particular, those related to space, drones, robots, cyberdefence, weapons systems).

Apart from providing funds, the European Commission has a key role to play in terms of regulations, protecting investments and sensitive infrastructure, competition, security of supply, managing key technologies and overall relations with third parties.

o O o

The MPL forms part of the bedrock fuelled by developments in the European Union aimed at reinforcing EU strategic autonomy, the European DITB in particular, and is equally a contributory factor. The Act is fully in line with the objective of "European sovereignty" advocated by French President Emmanuel Macron in The Hague on 11 April 2023.

Olivier Gras
Brigadier-General, Armament Corps (retired)
Secretary of EuroDéfense-France

Translated by ISIT students - Edit by C. Cross